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Abstract
Punishment, especially selfish punishment, has recently been identified as a potent
promoter in sustaining or even enhancing the cooperation among unrelated indi-
viduals. However, without other key mechanisms, the first-order social dilemma
and second-order social dilemma are still two enduring conundrums in biology
and the social sciences even with the presence of punishment. In the present
study, we investigate a spatial evolutionary four-strategy prisoner’s dilemma game
model with avoiding mechanism, where the four strategies are cooperation, de-
fection, altruistic and selfish punishment. By introducing the low level of random
mutation of strategies, we demonstrate that the presence of selfish punishment
with avoiding mechanism can alleviate the two kinds of social dilemmas for var-
ious parametrizations. In addition, we propose an extended pair approximation
method, whose solutions can essentially estimate the dynamical behaviors and fi-
nal evolutionary frequencies of the four strategies. At last, considering the analogy
between our model and the classical Lotka-Volterra system, we introduce interac-
tion webs based on the spatial replicator dynamics and the transformed payoff
matrix to qualitatively characterize the emergent co-exist strategy phases, and its
validity are supported by extensive simulations.
Keywords: Evolutionary game theory, Punishment, Identifying probability, Pair
∗Corresponding author at: Institute of Computational Physics and Complex Systems, Lanzhou
University, Lanzhou 730000, China.
Email address: wuzhx@lzu.edu.cn (Zhi-Xi Wu)
Preprint submitted to Elsevier October 6, 2018
ar
X
iv
:1
40
8.
26
10
v1
  [
ph
ys
ics
.so
c-p
h]
  1
2 A
ug
 20
14
approximation
1. Introduction
For centuries, the scales of most of human economic communities have ex-
panded dramatically from kin-based work-shops to intensively large-scale coop-
erative groups in which selfish individuals frequently cooperate with other ge-
netically unrelated ones. Kinds of mechanisms or rules have been developed to
explain or support the existence of such cooperative behaviors (Nowak (2006)).
In these range of rules, kin selection is merely applied to small kinship groups
(Hamilton (1971); Foster et al. (2006)). Direct reciprocity (Axelrod (1984)) can
explain the emergence of cooperation between unrelated individuals or even be-
tween members of different species, but it is limited to the repeated encounters
between the same two individuals. In the context of indirect reciprocity (Nowak
(2006); Nowak and Sigmund (1998b,a)), randomly chosen pairwise encounters
where two individuals do not have to meet again are admissible. However, it
can only promote cooperation on condition with sufficient reputation (Alexander
(1987); Haley and Fessler (2005)) that drives this deed. Additionally, network
reciprocity (Lieberman et al. (2005); Nowak (2006); Ohtsuki et al. (2006)) and
social diversity (Santos et al. (2008)) are only established in the population that
is not well-mixed, i.e., their operations rely heavily on the hierarchical structure
of populations. The significance of migration for the emergence and persistence
of cooperation has also been highlighted by the previous studies (Helbing and Yu
(2009); Yang et al. (2010)). Nevertheless, in real life, the cost of migration may
be very high, and the information about the destinations may also be insufficient
and limited (Borjas (1989); Drinkwater et al. (2003); Martin (2012); Buesser et al.
(2013)). For these reasons, punishment turns out to be a key role in sustaining the
cooperation as strangers frequently engage in interest transactions in large-scale
institutions (Boyd and Richerson (1992); Panchanathan and Boyd (2004)).
Furthermore, altruistic punishment has been used as a paradigm to promote
cooperation in large populations consisting of selfish unrelated or faceless indi-
viduals (Fehr and Ga¨chter (2002); Fowler and Christakis (2010)). However, it is
less likely to become a robust strategy (Perc (2012)) owing to the extra expenses
for the cost to punish defectors. Only recently, a few works have suggested another
way that altruism may be maintained by the defectors though punishing other de-
fectors, known as selfish punishment (Wilson and OGorman (2006); Nakamaru
and Iwasa (2006); Eldakar et al. (2007)). The concept of selfish punishment was
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originally suggested by an empirical experiment on humans demonstrating that
individuals most likely to punish other defectors themselves are most tempted to
defect (Wilson and OGorman (2006)). This experiment actually implies that a
certain part of defectors prefer to punish other defectors for themselves rather the
public welfares in some situations. Combing with reality, it is possible that cer-
tain groups of individuals, especially tricky cheaters, can take some steps such as
lying to punishers to avoid the sanctions in the presence of communication (Serra-
Garcia et al. (2013); Sheremeta and Shields (2013); Belot et al. (2012)), exempli-
fied by the proverb ‘a thief crying “Stop thief”’. These cheaters use punishment
as an evasion, which can be regarded as the alternative form of selfish punish-
ment. However, to our knowledge, this actual important mechanism has received
relatively little attention in evolutionary game theory. Further studies are still nec-
essary.
In order to further explore how this selfish punishment works, we design a
model involving cooperators (C), defectors (D), cooperative punishers (CP, i.e., al-
truistic punishers), and defective defectors (DP, i.e., selfish punishers) with avoid-
ing mechanism. Differing from the previous models (Helbing et al. (2010a,c);
Szolnoki et al. (2011); Nakamaru and Iwasa (2006); Panchanathan and Boyd
(2004); Fehr and Ga¨chter (2002); Fowler and Christakis (2010)) with respect to
punishment, our model is performed in the context of prisoner’s dilemma game
(PDG) along with a low level of random mutation. In detail, the sanctions from
punishment are always considered to be costly (Helbing et al. (2010a,c); Szolnoki
et al. (2011)). Similarly, both defective punishers and cooperative punsihers sanc-
tion defectors with a punishment fine at a personal punishment cost in our model,
without loss of generality and rationality. Unlike previous studies on the evolu-
tion of altruism with punishment (Helbing et al. (2010a,c); Szolnoki et al. (2011);
Nakamaru and Iwasa (2006); Panchanathan and Boyd (2004); Fehr and Ga¨chter
(2002); Fowler and Christakis (2010)), we add the avoiding behaviors represented
by the identifying probability to defective punishers, who punish not only other
defectors but also the ones with the same strategy. Moreover, we propose an ex-
tended pair approximation for the time evolution of the four strategies, allowing
us to track the dynamics features and stationary states of the system. At last, mo-
tivated by the works on ecological interaction networks (Knebel et al. (2013)), we
introduce interaction webs to qualitatively understand the stable coexistence and
extinction of different strategies.
It is worth noting that there are two kinds of social dilemmas in the model. One
is the conventional social dilemma – PDG, namely the first-order social dilemma
in which the free riders such as defectors can earn higher personal profits than
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cooperators whereas the well-being of the population depend only on the level
of cooperation. The other is the second-order social dilemma, where punishers
carry out punishment which reduces their fitnesses relative to those second-order
free riders (including pure cooperators) who do not punish (Nakamaru and Iwasa
(2006); Fehr and Rockenbach (2003); Fowler (2005); Sigmund et al. (2010)). In
this paper, it will be demonstrated that the presence of selfish punishment with
avoiding mechanism can help the individuals out of the two dilemmas.
2. Model
We consider a spatially structured population where each player is fastened on
one site of a square lattice of size N = L × L with periodic boundaries. Each
player (i) adopts strategy si ∈ {C,D,CP,DP}. Initially, the four strategies (C,
D, CP, and DP) are distributed randomly and uniformly over the lattice sites.
In each iteration, each player (i) firstly plays the PDG with its four nearest
neighbors in addition to itself to accumulate its original overall payoff P osi without
punishment. We have found that the situation where cooperators and altruistic
punishers in addition to selfish punishers coexisting stably will not be fulfilled
for various parametrizations if self-interaction (that the players can play the game
with themselves) is excluded. Without self-interaction, the positive role of selfish
punishment on the evolution of cooperation is weakened. We thus introduce the
self-interaction into the current model. In line with the definition of PDG, each
player gets the reward R if both choose to cooperate (C, CP) with each other, or
the payoff P if both defect (D, DP). A cooperator or cooperative punisher gets the
sucker’s payoff S against a defector or defective punisher, who gets the temptation
to defect T in such circumstance. We have checked that none of our findings for
T = b(b > 1), R = 1, and P = S = 0 are essentially changed if we instead set
P = ε where ε is positive but significantly below unity. For the sake of simplicity,
we just use the parametrization T = b (b > 1), R = 1, and P = S = 0, which
is also commonly adopted in many studies (Nowak and May (1992); Szabo´ and
To˝ke (1998); Santos and Pacheco (2005); Go´mez-Garden˜es et al. (2007)).
Secondly, the punishment is executed, i.e., the payoff P osi may be modified
as the remaining payoff Pmsi by subtracting punishment costs and/or punishment
fines. In reality, the cheaters in the face of punishers have a strong incentive to
hide their identities after a defection so as to escape the punishment, causing infor-
mation asymmetry. Considering this fact, we make an assumption that the states
of non-cooperative (D and DP) individuals are unobservable to other punishers in
our model. Consequently, there are three cases as follows: (i) To each punisher
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(si= CP or DP), it just selects one target j randomly from the non-cooperative
neighbors (sj= D or DP, j ∈ Γi where Γi denotes the set of neighbours of player
i) to identify the target either successfully (for D) or probably (for DP at a prob-
ability γ). Then the punisher i will impose a fine β on the exposed target at a
personal cost α if its original payoff is sufficient for punishment (P osi > α), or else
it will do nothing. It indicates that defective punishers (DP) can still avoid being
punished with probability 1 − γ even though they are selected. (ii) Correspond-
ingly, the selected non-cooperative player j will be either absolutely sanctioned
if sj= D or successfully punished with a probability γ when sj= DP, so that its
payoff is reduced by β. Instead, the unselected ones are capable of escaping the
punishment. (iii) PmC = P
o
C if si= C. A run for punishment over the whole lattice
is performed in a random fashion in which each punisher has and only has one
chance to punish.
Next, each player i chooses one of its four nearest neighbors at random and
imitates the strategy of the chosen co-player j with a probability (Szabo´ and To˝ke
(1998))
Wsi→sj(P
m
sj
− Pmsi ) = 1/{1 + exp[−(Pmsj − Pmsi )/κ]}, (1)
where the remaining payoff of j (Pmsj ) are also acquired in the same way men-
tioned above. κ = 0.1 is a noise parameter describing uncertainty of strategy
adoption. Over one whole Monte Carlo step (MCS), all the individuals perform
an attempt for strategy updating simultaneously.
The previous studies (Wolff (2012); Helbing et al. (2010a)) have stressed that
the random mutation can create some extent of strategy-mixing, and the introduc-
tion of mutation enable us to yield the deterministic replicator dynamics in the
limit of frequent sampling in the absence of mutations in a large population (Der-
cole et al. (2013)). Moreover, in the presence of the mutation, even though altru-
istic punishers and selfish punishers evolving from random mutation frequencies
cannot stabilise full cooperation (Wolff (2012)), they could have more chances
to touch the first-order free riders (D) and second-order free riders (C) (Helbing
et al. (2010a)) to suppress them. The performance of punishment would be thus
enhanced by random mutation. Therefore, following the previous studies (Hel-
bing et al. (2010a); Antal et al. (2009)), random mutation is introduced as a sep-
arate process in our model. In detail, each player changes its strategy blindly and
independently to one of other three strategies with a probability ν such that all
four states are potentially present in the population at a low frequency. We set
ν = 10−2 throughout this paper.
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The simulations are performed for systems with L > 200 in our model. The
final densities of all four strategies (ρs) are obtained after at least 1.0× 104 Monte
Carlo steps (MCS) to guarantee equilibrium existence, and averaged over 20-50
independent realizations to insure a low variability. The simulation results are also
complemented and supported by analytical predications from an extended pair
approximation method by taking into account the details of the punishment (see
Appendix). To get a detailed qualitative portrait of the stable co-exist phase, we
put forward interaction webs in analogy to Lotka-Volterra (LV) networks (Knebel
et al. (2013)) being detailed in the following section.
3. Results
Fig. 1: The frequencies of four types of strategies as a function of b for γ = 0.2 (top panels (a)-(d))
and γ = 0.8 (bottom panels (e)-(h)), where γ denotes the identifying probability that a defective
punisher is identified and punished by another punisher. Specifically, solid symbols represent the
simulation results for α = 0.3 and β = 0.9 (ξ > 1), where the corresponding results based on
pair approximation (see Appendix A) are denoted by solid lines. Open symbols represent the
simulation results for α = 0.6 and β = 0.4 (ξ < 1), where the corresponding results based on the
pair approximation are denoted by dashed lines.
Differing from previous studies, selfish punishment with avoiding mechanism
diversifies the response of the strategies to punishment cost, punishment fine, and
temptation to defect (see Fig. 1). For convenience, we firstly denote punishment
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coefficient ξ by the ratio of β to α i.e., ξ = β
α
. For ξ < 1 (α = 0.6, β = 0.4), the
frequencies of C (D) does not decrease (increase) monotonically with b, indepen-
dently of the identifying probability γ. For example, in the case γ = 0.2, when
the value of b is just slightly greater than 1, the population in steady state is almost
composed of cooperators and cooperative punishers because non-cooperative in-
dividuals even isolated ones can hardly survive in the population. Cooperative
punishers have little chance (i.e., don’t need to spend external payoffs) to punish
defectors. Therefore the random mutation makes that cooperative punishers no
great difference to cooperators such that the density of cooperators cannot reach
a much high level. When b is approaching b∗ = 4/3 ' 1.33, non-cooperative in-
dividuals begin to grow and persist in the population, whereas the cost of punish-
ment on non-cooperative individuals is still not so great that cooperative punishers
could compete against cooperators. For b ≈ b∗, the payoffs of non-cooperators
(D and DP) staying in small clusters less than three (e.g., in forms of lines, cor-
ners or isolated islands) can be written as PDP,D = (k − 1)b∗ ≈ 4, which is
comparable to that of clustered cooperators or cooperative punishers in contact
with them. In face of second-order free riders, the cooperative punishers owning
non-cooperative neighbors (most of them are defectors) are at a disadvantageous
position because they have to pay considerable external cost α to punish those
nearest defectors in small clusters. Meanwhile defective punishers have to pay
much more than the losses of other non-cooperative individuals in spite of that
they have a high chance to escape the punishment (ξ is small). In contrast to clus-
ters of D and DP, clusters of C are robust or even aggressive. Consequently, there
are almost isolated defectors and clusters of cooperators accompanied by few pun-
ishers (CP and DP) in the population in the equilibrium when b ≈ b∗. As such, the
density of cooperators has a chance to grow to high level. As b grows approaching
to 2, the population is dominated by defectors and defective punishers, and coop-
erators and cooperative punishers go extinct. The punishment on defectors is not
likely to happen because the payoffs of defective punishers are nearly zero. As
a result, there are no differences between D and DP owing to random mutation,
they coexist stably together.
For ξ > 1 (α = 0.3, β = 0.9), punishers (CP and DP) behave non-monotonically
with b, relating to γ. There exists optimal moderate b that could maximize them.
Taking the cooperative punishers as an example, in the case γ = 0.2, there are
only cooperators and cooperative punishers in the population in the steady state
when b ≈ 1. The reason that ξ > 1 facilitates the survival of punishers (CP
and DP) is due to fact that they don’t need to spend too much cost to suppress
non-cooperative individuals (D and DP). As b is approaching b = 1.5, coop-
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erators begin to shrink while both cooperative punishers and defective punish-
ers are growing. When b ≈ 1.5, the defective punishers especially the ones in
small clusters (existing in form of lines, corners or isolated islands) of the non-
cooperative strategies can firstly prevail because they can obtain large benefits
from their nearest non-defective neighbors (C and CP) (P oDP ≥ (k − 1) ∗ b > 4
while P oDP ≥ (k − 2) ∗ b < 4). After punishment, they still own enough incomes
(because PmDP = P
o
DP − α =≥ (k − 1) ∗ b − α ≈ 4) to conquer the domains
of cooperators and protect cooperative punishers from the excessive invasion of
cooperators. Besides, the clusters of CP can also coexist with those of DP on ac-
count of the appropriate value of b (the payoffs of the defective punishers in larger
clusters PmDP = P
o
DP−α =≥ (k−2)∗b−α < 4). Irrespective of small identifying
probability, the defective punishers could be still reduced by being probably tar-
geted and punished by the cooperative punishers. When b  1.5, the population
is once again dominated by either defectors or defective punishers based on the
arguments in the last paragraph. Consequently, besides fair amount of defective
punishers for b ≈ 1.5, there are greatest number of cooperative punishers in the
population in comparison with that for other values of b.
The results in Fig. 1 show that the evolution of the population is strongly re-
lated to the punishment cost and fine, the identifying probability, and the tempta-
tion to defect. However, despite of the identifying probability and punishment cost
and fine, non-defective individuals (C and CP) finally go extinct as b is approach-
ing to 2.0, in contrary to the prevalence of defectors and defective punishers. The
phenomena observed above are also supported and corroborated by an extended
pair approximation method by considering the detailed rules of the punishment
(see Appendix A). The method is sufficient to provide predictions in accordance
with the MC simulations.
For a better understanding of the dynamic features of our model, we portray
the temporal evolution of the system as appropriate combinations of strategy fre-
quencies in Fig. 2 with increasing value of the temptation to defect. It is observed
that the mixture of two or more strategies rise simultaneously, while the others fall
at the moment. On the one hand, individuals of certain strategies form coopera-
tive islands which are beneficial for them so that they can spread efficiently and
nearly conquer the whole population together (Szabo´ and To˝ke (1998); Helbing
et al. (2010c); Szolnoki et al. (2011)). For instance, in Fig. 2a and d, cooperators
thrive because cooperative punishers can force the non-cooperative ones (D and
DP) out on account of small b. Meanwhile, cooperative punishers compensate
the cost of punishing non-cooperative individuals by cooperating with other co-
operators. As a result, the alliance of both cooperators and cooperative punishers
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Fig. 2: Evolution of the four strategies over time for different values of bwith γ = 0.2, on condition
that α < β (α = 0.3 and β = 0.9 a-c) and α > β (α = 0.6 and β = 0.4 d-f). Open symbols
represent simulation results, where solid lines with the same color correspond to solutions of the
pair approximation. As displayed, the blue (black) lines are more closed to the corresponding blue
(black) symbols than the other lines. (For interpretation of the references to color in this figure
caption, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
are the final winners. In Fig. 2e, punishers are restricted because they have to
pay much more than the losses of non-cooperative individuals (D and DP) to be
punished for ξ > 1. In contrast, both defectors and cooperators can outcompete
the punishers because they are not burdened by punishment costs. On the other
hand, it also appears that a whole set of combinations of altruism towards mem-
bers of the strategies performing poorly and spiteful attitudes towards aggressive
members can be evolutionarily stable, despite the low fractions of these aligned
strategies. For example, in Fig. 2, cooperative punishers can coexist harmoniously
(because CP and DP form an anti-coordination game) with defective punishers,
i.e. the dominators of the population. Hence cooperators ally with them to avoid
excessive exploitations by the dominators, followed by defectors feeding on coop-
erators. Similarly, C+D+CP, and C+DP in Figs. 2c and f form an alliance to fight
against the evasion of the dominant strategies DP and D, respectively. Essentially,
inter-group like altruism and invasions of dominant strategies provide a counter-
balance for each other. In addition, as soon as the alliances starts to work, the
frequencies of strategies change with an almost constant ratio, which have been
checked by complementary evaluations.
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Fig. 3: Typical snapshots of the simulation grid for b = 1.48 γ = 0.2 with two groups of pun-
ishment cost and punishment fine, α = 0.3 and β = 0.9 (top panels), α = 0.6 and β = 0.4
(bottom panels) at different iterations displayed in above figure. Here, 100 × 100 windows of
computer simulations on a 200× 200 lattice are shown. Cooperators are represented by dark blue,
cooperative punishers by baby blue, defectors by croci and defective punishers by brown.
The two types of behaviors observed above can be described as ’alliance
phenomena’–two or more strategies form alliances or clusters to either repel the
aggressive strategies or win the territorial battles efficiently. It can be intuitively
verified in snapshots of the time evolution depicted in Fig. 3. In the top panels,
all clusters of cooperators border that of cooperative punishers in order that they
can both avoid exploitations from defective punishers and earn enough payoffs by
cooperating with cooperative punishers. In the bottom panels of Fig. 3, clusters
of defective punishers only contact with cooperators besides defective punishers.
Depending on sufficient payoffs, they can resist the aggression from defectors to
survive. The alliance phenomenon is also observed widespread in reality and sup-
ported by studies on microbiological social behaviors (Falconer et al. (2011)) and
strategic alliance (Parkhe (1993); Todeva and Knoke (2005)).
Although there are small deviations, the pair approximation still provides ex-
cellent predictions for the final steady frequencies (Fig. 1) and evolutionary pro-
cesses (Fig. 2) of the four strategies. Additionally, it can even well reproduce
extinction points (Fig. 1). Actually, the deviations between the simulations and
the approximations rise from the the fact the individuals of the same or different
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types gather into clusters together (Fig. 3), especially cooperators and cooperative
punishers (Fig. 3a-c). It deviates from the assumption of infinite well-mixed pop-
ulations of pair approximation, which makes the approximation work relatively
poor in estimating the dynamic behaviors of cooperators and cooperative punish-
ers.
In the model, non-defective individuals own the ‘self-sustaining’ advanta-
geous ability of being able to benefit from cooperating with themselves. Mean-
while not all non-cooperative individuals selected and targeted have to be pun-
ished because of the prerequisite that the payoffs of its neighboring punishers
must be sufficient for an execution. To further investigate the interactions and
coexistence between different strategies shown in Fig. 4, we make a reasonable
assumption that all non-cooperative ones selected and targeted by their neighbor-
ing punishers have to be punished, as well as that non-defective individuals cannot
earn extra income by playing with themselves. It is equivalent to the case that the
two advantages of non-defective individuals and non-cooperative ones cancel out
each other. We thus obtain the normalized payoff matrix A = [aij] with vanishing
diagonals

C CP D DP
C 0 0 0 γ(α + β)
CP 0 0 −α γβ
D b− 1 b− β − 1 0 γα + (γ − 1)β
DP b− 1 b− γβ − 1 −α 0
, (2)
without changing the competitive dynamics of the strategies. However, it is known
that pair approximation and standard replicator dynamics are not consistent. In
the presence of weak selection, Ohtsuki and Nowak (2006, 2008) have developed
spatial evolutionary dynamics and ESS conditions on regular graphs, showing
that evolutionary stability on graphs does not imply evolutionary stability in a
well-mixed population. In the limit of the weak selection, the spatial evolutionary
dynamics have the form of replicator equations with a transformed payoff ma-
trix B = [bij] where bij =
aii+aij−ajj−aji
k−2 originating from pairwise comparison
updating (Ohtsuki and Nowak (2006)). Therefore, we get the new payoff matrix
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C = [cij]

C CP D DP
C 0 0 1
2
(1− b) 1
2
(1− b) + 3
2
(α + β)γ
CP 0 0 1
2
(1− b) + 1
2
(β − 3α) 1
2
(1− b) + 2βγ
D 3
2
(b− 1) 3
2
(b− 1) + 1
2
(α− 3β) 0 3
2
(α + β)γ + 1
2
(α− 3β)
DP 3
2
(b− 1)− 1
2
(α + β)γ 3
2
(b− 1)− 2βγ 1
2
(β − 3α)− 1
2
(α + β)γ 0
; (3)
which is sum of the original payoff matrix A and the transmitted payoff metrix B
(i.e., cij = aij + bij). Using matrix C to consider the effects of spatial structure
of square lattice, we can determine whether a four-strategy phase (four strategies
coexist stably together in the population) or three-strategy phase (three of the four
strategies coexist stably together in the population) emerges. Accordingly, we
have checked that the four-strategy phase is impossible in the population. There
exist three-strategy phases at most. For three-strategy phases, C + CP + D and
C + CP + DP are impossible, whereas C + D + DP (CP + D + DP ) exists
conditionally (for more details see figures form Fig. 7 to Fig. 10 in Appendix. B).
However, the above complicated quantitative method could not be used to
justify the possibilities of two-strategy phases. Through studying the interplay
among the four strategies, we notice the similar mechanisms such as competi-
tion and predator-prey-like manner (Dobramysl and Ta¨uber (2013)) underlying
the stationary coexistence of the strategies. The functions of the system is in anal-
ogy to LV systems (Knebel et al. (2013)) even though the individuals of different
strategies compete indirectly with each other on the basis of their accumulative
payoffs rather than the reaction rates. Motivated by these studies, we develop
a simple approach to qualitatively understand the stable coexistence and extinc-
tion of strategies. The interactions among the strategies can be well described
and further visualized by a fully-connected interaction web in which each vertex
(edge/arrow) represents a strategy (the interacting properties of two strategies).
Given an example of the case CP + D, the form of the new payoff matrix is(
CP 0 1
2
(1− b) + 1
2
(β − 3α)
D 3
2
(b− 1) + 1
2
(α− 3β) 0
)
. For β < α
3
+ (b − 1),
strategy D is absolutely an ESS against C, which can be expressed as D −→ CP
in the interaction webs. For α
3
+ (b− 1) < β < 3α + (b− 1), it is a coordination
game in which who is the ultimate winner depends on that which strategy is more
advantageous in the competition. In more detail, CP is the ultimate strategy when
β + (b − 1) < β < 3α + b − 1 (also expressed as CP −→ D for simplicity
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Fig. 4: Final stationary distributions of the four strategies cooperators (a), cooperative punishers
(b), defectors (c) and defective punishers (d) as a function of α and β. The parameters are taken as
b = 1.6 and γ = 0.2. The final results are obtained by averaging 20 independent runs. Note that
the separation between yellow and red reveals that the fraction of strategies change sharply, but
does not represent a phase boundary. The four lines are β = −α+ b−13γ (dash dotted line), β = b−14γ
(dash dotted line), β = 1+γ1−γα (solid line), and β = b−1+α (solid line). The dash dotted lines give
the boundaries between A ←→ B and A −→ B (or B −→ A), and the solid lines for A −→ B
and B −→ A. They divide the whole parameter region into ten subregions as marked in the first
subgraph (a). As displayed in the figure, there are no four-strategy phases C+D+CP +DP and
C + CP +D but obscure three-strategy phase C + CP +DP . The simulations partially agree
the predictions from the method based on the spatial predictor equations.
because the relationship between the two strategies in the model is similar to the
predator-prey-like manner that one strategy is an ESS against another) because
E(CP,D) > E(D,CP ), otherwise D is the winner (D −→ CP ) (Adami et al.
(2012)) when α
3
+ (b − 1) < β < α + (b − 1). Furthermore, A ←→ B means
that it is an anti-coordination game giving rise to a stable mixture of strategy A
and strategy B. Dashed arrows represent the special predator-prey-like manner be-
tween cooperators and cooperative punishers in any situation. With this method,
we can give the interaction webs (see Fig. 5) for the results presented in Fig. 4,
where every two circles and the arrow connecting them represent one basic func-
tional unit.
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It turns out that we can identify all the stable co-exist phase portraits of the
dynamics governed by the values of punishment cost, punishment fine, identifying
probability and temptation to defect, according to the manner presented in the
caption of Fig. 5. Essentially, we just simplify multi-body problem into two-body
problem by investigating the strategy pairs and ignoring errors arising from the
multi-strategy interactions. Fortunately, this approximate treatment is supported
by coincidence between the simulations in Fig. 4 and the predictions from Fig. 5.
Most importantly, both Fig. 4 and Fig. 5 reflect that the two undesirable social
dilemmas, conventional dilemma and the second-order dilemma change signifi-
cantly by adding selfish punishment with avoiding mechanism. It is also found
that behaviors of the population can be mainly distinguished by β = 1+γ
1−γα that
characterizes the interaction between defective punishers and defectors, though
defectors are also in the face of punishment of cooperative punishers. For β <
1+γ
1−γα (D −→ DP ) (regions A, B, and E in Fig. 4), the selfish and altruistic pun-
ishers indeed promote the level of cooperation within a polymorphic equilibrium,
but sacrifice themselves (and D is absolutely an ESS against DP for β < 1+3γ
3(1−γ)α).
Because the punishers, especially those defective ones, have to bear larger ad-
ditional punishment costs relative to what they squeeze from cooperators. Their
competitiveness are reduced. By contrast, defectors and cooperators avoid extra
costs by punishment efforts. Moreover, cooperators can exploit the defection-
suppressing benefits created by the punishers. Consequently, they can survive and
prevail, further leading to the growth of defectors, which is also confirmed by the
predictions based on interaction webs (Fig. 5). This situation is always referred to
as the second-order soial dilemma. Nonetheless, this is changing with β getting
larger than 1+γ
1−γα (regions C, D, F, G, H, I, and J in Fig. 4). Defective punishers do
not need to entail much to crowd the defectors out. They can both take advantage
of cooperators to exploit enough payoffs and efficiently wriggle out of the pun-
ishment owing to small γ. That can also protect the cooperative punishers from
excessive invasion of the second-order free riders such as cooperators. As a result,
stable coexistences of cooperative punishers and defective punishers, i.e. altruis-
tic punishment and selfish punishment arise and persist. Meanwhile, conventional
(first-order) free riders are nearly eliminated, whereas the cooperators can ally and
cooperate with altruistic punishers to survive (also see the arguments for Fig. 2 and
Fig. 3). It implies that the two social dilemmas are factually alleviated. Departing
from previous studies (Nakamaru and Iwasa (2006); Helbing et al. (2010b)), the
accurate predictions based on interaction webs (Fig. 5) also suggest that the sta-
ble coexistences of altruistic punishers, selfish punishers, and cooperators in our
model are independent of the spatial neighborhood of the population.
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Fig. 5: The interaction webs for the ten corresponding regions shown in Fig 4, including the
co-existing phase induced from the webs. The inducing rules are as follows: (i) On account of
‘self-sustaining’ and ’clustering’ advantages of cooperators and cooperative punishers (they can
benefit from playing game with themselves and clustering others), they will be ”eaten up” only
if there are no one-way arrows pointing other strategies from C or CP and no coexisting edges
(←→) connecting them, or else they would still survive in the population if they feed on others
or coexist stably with others. (ii) For defectors and defective punishers, they would just exist or
thrive if there are no one-way arrows pointing to them but the one-way arrows from them or the
coexisting edges connecting them.
As γ increases to 0.8, the interaction between cooperative punishers and de-
fectors (identified by β = b − 1 + α plotted as dotted lines in Fig. 6) plays a
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Fig. 6: Final stationary distributions of the four strategies cooperators (a), cooperative punishers
(b), defectors (c) and defective punishers (d) as a function of α and β. The parameters are taken as
b = 1.4 and γ = 0.8. The final results are obtained by averaging 20 independent runs. Note that
the separation between yellow and red indicates that the fractions of strategies change sharply, but
does not represent a phase boundary. The dash dotted lines form bottom to top are β = −α+ b−13γ ,
β = b−14γ , β =
3(b−1)
4γ , and β = −α + 3(b−1)γ . The solid lines from bottom to top are β = 1+γ1−γα
and β = b − 1 + α. They divide the whole parameter region into fourteen ones as marked in
the first subgraph (a). As displayed in the figure, four-strategy phase C + D + CP + DP and
three-strategy phase C+CP +D are impossible, but obscure three-strategy phase C+CP +DP
can appear.
decisive role (see Fig 6). High identifying probability makes defective punishers
no great difference to defectors, resulting in that more selfish punishers will be
punished especially for β < b− 1 + α. The punishment targeting free riders and
the exploitations of cooperators from them are also naturally weakened. As a re-
sult, the second social dilemma is still remained (Fig 6) for β < b−1+α (regions
A-J in Fig. 6). In the case where β > b − 1 + α (regions K-N in Fig. 6), coop-
erative punishers become superior to defectors (CP −→ D), while cooperators
can outcompete cooperative punishers. As a consequence, the mixture of altru-
istic punishers and cooperators is maintained, suggesting that the second-order
dilemma can be resolved. Similarly, we apply the interaction webs to the case
where γ = 0.8 to validate the robustness of this method (see Fig 11 in Appendix
C). It is still valid in most subregions except several ones near the junction of the
line β = 1+γ
1−γα estimating the interaction properties between D and DP, the line
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β = −α+ b−1
3γ
for C and DP, and the line β = 3(b−1)
4γ
for CP and DP. The reason for
the failure of the interaction webs is that the alliance phenomenon of the strate-
gies predicted to be extinct (CP and DP) takes effect. The individuals of the weak
strategies (CP and DP) incline to cluster themselves (Helbing et al. (2010a,c)) or
contact with the more resistant co-exist partners so as to assert against invasion
from the aggressive ones (C or D). Nevertheless, the stabilizations of cooperation
is established despite the changes of α and β (see Fig. 6a).
Like what obtained by Brandt et al. (2003), both cooperation and altruism can
be guaranteed simultaneously in a crowd of faceless individuals for a wide param-
eter range (just β & α) in our model, by just introducing selfish punishment with
avoiding mechanism and without the need for other mechanisms such as reputa-
tion. Instead of the results in Brandt et al. (2003), the punishment with avoiding
mechanism allows the CP strategy to capture more individuals than that of the
second-order free riders (C) for β & α, where defective punishers thrive as well
for small γ. Whereas the coexistence of cooperators and defectors is still possible
for β . α, which is similar to the results of (Helbing et al. (2010a,c)) and contrast
to that of (Brandt et al. (2003)). Differing from the related works (Brandt et al.
(2003); Helbing et al. (2010a,c)), the system converges to a bistable or even multi-
stable state except a homogeneous phase through out the whole parameter ranges
in our model. However, our study share with the related researches (Helbing et al.
(2010a,c); Szolnoki et al. (2011); Brandt et al. (2003)) the common feature that
increasing punishment fine over punishment cost can facilitate the abundance of
punishers especially altruistic ones.
4. Discussion
In order to deeply explore the impact of the selfish punishment, we have pro-
posed a spatial evolutionary four-strategy prisoner’s dilemma game model involv-
ing cooperators, defectors, altruistic punishment, and selfish punishment account-
ing for avoiding behaviors. Meanwhile, we introduced a low level of random
strategy mutation into the evolutionary process. Unlike the monotonic changes of
strategies revealed by previous studies (Szabo´ et al. (2005); Tarnita et al. (2009)),
we observed the diverse responses of the strategies to changes of punishment cost
and fine, identifying probability, and the temptation to defect. It can be found
optimal levels of various types of individuals favoured by the different mediate
values of b. Afterwards, we employ an extended pair approximation method in-
volving four strategies and considering the details of the punishment to estimate
the dynamical behaviors and final evolutionary frequencies of the strategies. Sur-
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prisingly, the predications of the method are in well agreement with the simula-
tions. At he same time, in our model, we observed the ‘alliance phenomena’ – two
or more kinds of individuals form alliances or clusters being beneficial for them,
so as to efficiently either repel the dominant strategies or even win the territorial
battles. At last, motivated by the works on ecological interaction networks, we in-
troduced the interaction webs in analogy to LV networks (Knebel et al. (2013)) to
qualitatively address the stable coexistences and extinctions of strategies in terms
of new payoff matrix considering the effects of spatial structure of square lattice.
The good performance of the interaction webs revealed that the effect of the selfish
punishment on the evolution of altruism depends on the punishment cost and fine,
the identifying probability, instead of the temptation to defect ( Lieberman et al.
(2005); Killingback et al. (2006); Nowak et al. (2010); Helbing et al. (2010b)).
The vital function of selfish punishment on the evolution of altruism has been
noticed and primarily investigated in Nakamaru and Iwasa (2006); Eldakar et al.
(2007). In these previous researches it is difficult to sustain or even promote co-
operation and altruism simultaneously, particularly second-order altruism (i.e CP)
and the selfish punishment itself. Interestingly, in our results, addition of the self-
ish punishers not only trend to encourage the prevalence of the both punishers (CP
and DP) but also ensure the survival of cooperators (C) as long as β > 1+γ
1−γα for
small identifying probability. Alternatively, for β > b−1+α, although the selfish
punishers with weak avoiding ability (large γ) are nearly eliminated by altruistic
punishers, the system still arrives at the absorbing C+CP state i.e., cooperators
and altruistic punishers coexist in harmony in the population. Nevertheless, in
either case, the cooperation in the population is maintained. We thus conclude
from the research results in this paper that the selfish punishment with avoiding
mechanism can alleviate the two types of social dilemmas at the same time under
certain parameter conditions. Moreover, this reveals that defectors are more likely
to be punished by other defectors, which can be taken as a complementarity to
what stressed by Hauert et al. (2007),
As we known, humans have maintained cooperation in scales ranging from
kin-based hunter-gather bands to large modern states over the last 50000 years,
accompanied by cheating and altruistic punishment in the form of regulations
or codes (Mathew and Boyd (2011)). Theoretically, altruistic punishers suffer
a considerable cost from pure cooperation, so they tend to go extinct. Neverthe-
less, our findings confirm that the selfish punishment with avoiding mechanism
can exempted the second-order altruists from this dilemma. In the perspective of
evolutionary biology theory, it indicates that maybe the selfish punishment and
altruistic punishment evolved at approximately the same time in human history.
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The present study thus provide a new insight into understanding the origin and
persistence of altruism and selfish punishment in social life.
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Appendix A: Extended pair approximation
Let ρsxsy (sx, sy ∈ {C,D,CP,DP}) denote the frequency of strategy pairs
e.g. C − C, C − D, D − DP and so on. Each individual owns k = 4 nearest
neighbors, thus there are 12 types of strategy pairs. qsx|sy = ρsxsy/ρsy specifies
the conditional probability to find an imitator owning strategy sx given a target
neighbor adopting strategy sy. The main idea of pair approximation is to describe
the dynamics of strategy pairs, meaning that everything has to be expressed in
terms of configurations no more complex than pairs. Therefore, on the basis of
the compatibility condition (ρsx =
∑
sy
ρsxsy ), the symmetry condition (ρsxsy =
ρsysx), and closure conditions (
∑
sx,sy
ρsxsy = 1), we choose to pay our attention on
nine strategy pairs C−C, C−D, C−DP , C−CP , D−D, D−CP , D−DP ,
CP −CP , CP −DP . We treat them as the variables for tracing the behaviors of
the population.
During the course of the PDG game, changes of strategy frequencies take
place only when a target player x switch its strategy to the different strategy of
a referencing neighbor y. We consider a configuration where an imitator playing
strategy sx against the neighboring player with strategy sy. Let kC , kD, kCP ,
and kDP denote the number of cooperators, defectors, cooperative, and defective
punishers in imitator’s neighborhood on a square lattice, where k = kC + kD +
kCP + kDP . The frequency of such configuration is
T kkC ,kD,kCP q
kC
C|sxq
kD
D|sxq
kCP
CP |sxq
k−kC−kD−kCP
DP |sx . (4)
Here, T kkC ,kD,kCP represents the coefficient in the four type expansion, i.e., T
k
kC ,kD,kCP
=
k!
kC !kD!kCP !(k−kC−kD−kCP )! .
The probability of the configuration that the target neighbor y has k′C coop-
erators, k′D defectors, k
′
CP cooperative punishers, and k
′
DP defective punishers
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among the k − 1 remaining neighbors including the imitator x is
T k−1
k
′
C ,k
′
D,k
′
CP
q
k
′
C
C|sysxq
k
′
D
D|sysxq
k
′
CP
CP |sysxq
k−k′C−k
′
D−k
′
CP−1
DP |sysx . (5)
qs|sysx (s ∈ {C,D,CP,DP}) gives the conditional probability that one player
next to the strategy pair sy − sx owns strategy s. Furthermore, the triplet config-
uration is approximated by the assembles of the configurations that are not more
complex than pairs (qs|sysx ≈ qs|sy ) to insure the a moment closure of Eqs. (4) and
(5). Combining with the expression of conditional probability, Eqs (4) and (5) can
be reduced to
T kkC ,kD,kCPΩsx(k, kC , kD, kCP ) and T
k−1
k
′
C ,k
′
D,k
′
CP
Ωsy(k − 1, k
′
C , k
′
D, k
′
CP ), (6)
where Ωsx(k, kC , kD, kCP ) =
ρ
kC
Csx
ρ
kD
Dsx
ρ
kCP
CPsx
ρ
k−kC−kD−kCP
DPsx
ρksx
and Ωsy(k−1, kC , kD, kCP ) =
ρ
k
′
C
Csx
ρ
k
′
D
Dsx
ρ
k
′
CP
CPsx
ρ
k−k′C−k
′
D−k
′
CP−1
DPsx
ρk−1sy
. Eq. (6) gives the probability of existence of a con-
figuration surrounding imitator x and target player y in terms of the link densities
and strategy frequencies.
By neglecting the neighborhood of (values of kC , kD kCP , and kDP ) the im-
itator, the probability that state of player x switches from sx to sy can be written
as
Tr
sx→sy
s′xs
′
y
=
ksy
k
k−1∑
k
′
C ,k
′
D,k
′
CP
T k−1
k
′
C ,k
′
D,k
′
CP
Ωsx(k − 1, k
′
C , k
′
D, k
′
CP )Wsx→sy(P
m
sy − Pmsx ). (7)
That leads to a corresponding changes in the number of the strategy pairs (such
as pair s′x − s′y, where s′x, s′y ∈ {C,D,CPDP}). We let ∆nsx→sys′x,s′y (kC , kD, kCP )
denote this change in the number of s′x − s′y pair due to the switching event from
sx to sy for given by kC , kD, and kCP . Subsequently taking into account all the
possible neighborhood of the imitator x, we obtain the final expressions of the
overall changes in frequency of strategy pair s′x − s′y:
ρ˙s′xs
′
y
=
1
k
∑
sx,sy
kC ,kD,kCP
T kkC ,kD,kCPΩsx(k, kC , kD, kCP )∆n
sx→sy
s′x,s
′
y
(kC , kD, kCP )Tr
sx→sy
s′xs
′
y
(8)
in the limit of large population sizes N →∞ (Fu et al. (2010)).
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Herein Pmx (kC , kD, kCP , kDP ) are accumulated according to the manner de-
scribed in Sec. 2. For cooperators,
PmC (kC , kD, kCP , kDP ) = kC + kCP + 1.0. (9)
However, for punishers and defectors, we must consider the situation whether the
player and its punishing neighbors are capable of punishing its non-cooperative
individuals. Correspondingly, there are three cases. (i) For cooperative punishers,
PmCP (kC , kD, kCP , kDP ) = kC + kCP + 1.0, if kC + kCP + 1.0 < α (10)
PmCP (kC , kD, kCP , kDP ) = kC + kCP + 1.0−
kD + γkDP
kD + kDP
α if kC + kCP + 1.0 > α.
(ii)For defectors,
PmD (kC , kD, kCP , kDP ) = (kC + kCP )b (11)
if
{
k(qC|CP + qCP |CP ) + 1.0 < α
k(qC|DP + qCP |DP )b < α
PmD (kC , kD, kCP , kDP ) = (kC + kCP )b− kCPSD,CP
if
{
k(qC|CP + qCP |CP ) + 1.0 > α
k(qC|DP + qCP |DP )b < α
PmD (kC , kD, kCP , kDP ) = (kC + kCP )b− kDPSD,DP
if
{
k(qC|CP + qCP |CP ) + 1.0 < α
k(qC|DP + qCP |DP )b > α
PmD (kC , kD, kCP , kDP ) = (kC + kCP )b− kCPSD,CP − kDPSD,DP
if
{
k(qC|CP + qCP |CP ) + 1.0 > α
k(qC|DP + qCP |DP )b > α
(iii) For defective punishers, at first, the original payoff can be obtained according
to the following equations:
P oDP (kC , kD, kCP , kDP ) = (kC + kCP )b if (kC + kCP )b < α, (12)
P oDP (kC , kD, kCP , kDP ) = (kC + kCP )b−
kD + γkDP
kD + kDP
α if (kC + kCP )b > α.
Then the remaining payoffs PmDP (kC , kD, kCP , kDP ) are obtained following the
similar manner as in Eq. (12). SD,CP and SD,DP (SDP,CP and SDP,DP ) represents
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the punishment from one of defector’s (defective punisher’s) neighbors in state
of cooperative punishment and defective punishment, respectively. The proba-
bility that a cooperative (defective) punisher selects one defector randomly from
its non-cooperative neighbors (D, DP) is 1
kqD|CP+kqDP |CP
( 1
kqD|DP+kqDP |DP
) through
ignoring the impact of loops and the configurations that are more complex than
pairs. Consequently, we have SD,CP = βk(qD|CP+qDP |CP ) =
β
k(
ρDCP
ρCP
+
ρDPCP
ρCP
)
=
ρCP β
k(ρDCP+ρDPCP )
and SD,DP = βk(qD|DP+qDP |DP ) =
β
k(
ρDDP
ρDP
+
ρDPDP
ρDP
)
= ρDP β
k(ρDDP+ρDPDP )
.
SDP,CP = γSD,CP and SDP,DP = γSD,DP . Pmy (k
′
C , k
′
D, k
′
CP , k
′
DP ) can be accu-
mulated in the same way.
Given an initial well-mixed condition that ρsxsy(0) =
1
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and ρs(0) = 14
(s ∈ {C,D,CP,DP}) satisfying the closure condition, we can trace the dynamic
changes of the frequencies of strategy pairs according to Eq. (8). The steady state
can be solved by setting ρ˙s′xs′y = 0 or by numerically iterating these equations to a
steady state for a long time. Additionally, combining with the random mutation,
the evolution of frequencies of the four strategies can be tracked in the following
manner:
ρs(t) =
∑
sx,sy ;
sxorsy=s;sx=sy=s
ρsxsy(t)(1− ν) +
ν
3.0
∑
s′ 6=sx
ρs′ (t). (13)
Appendix B: Analysis for strategy phases based on spatial replicator equation
On basis of the spatial replicator equations considering the spatial structure of
the population (Ohtsuki and Nowak (2006, 2008)), the payoff for the four strate-
gies are Psi =
4∑
j=1
ρsjcij . We assume that the four strategies can coexist with each
other, i.e., the relationship PC = PCP = PD = PDP is satisfied. With the normal-
ization condition
4∑
i=1
ρsi = 1, we can plot the frequencies of all four strategies in
Fig. 7 with b = 1.6 and γ = 0.2, in Fig. 8 with b = 1.4 and γ = 0.8. It suggests
that the four-strategy phase is impossible in the population.
By means of the same method, we can determine whether a three-strategy
phase (i.e., three strategies can finally coexist stably together) can emerge. Ac-
cordingly, there are four different cases as follows.
(i) For C+CP+D phase:
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Fig. 7: The frequencies of four strategies based on spatial replicator equation, as function of α
and β for b = 1.6 and γ = 0.2. It can be observed that there are not parameter regions where the
relationships 0 < ρC < 1, 0 < ρD < 1, 0 < ρCP < 0, and 0 < ρDP < 0 are satisfied at the same
time. It indicates that the coexistence of the four strategies is impossible.
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Fig. 8: The frequencies of four strategies based on spatial replicator equation, as function of α
and β for b = 1.4 and γ = 0.8. It can be observed that there are not parameter regions where the
relationships 0 < ρC < 1, 0 < ρD < 1, 0 < ρCP < 0, and 0 < ρDP < 0 are satisfied at the same
time. It also indicates that the coexistence of the four strategies is impossible.
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
C CP D
C 0 0 1
2
(1− b)
CP 0 0 1
2
(1− b) + 1
2
(β − 3α)
D 3
2
(b− 1) 3
2
(b− 1) + 1
2
(α− 3β) 0
 is the new
payoff matrix. Combing with the closure condition ρC + ρCP + ρD = 1 and
coexisting condition PC = PCP = PD, we obtain fractions of the three strategies
ρC = 1 +
3(b−1)
α−3β , ρCP =
3(1−b)
α−3β , and ρD = 0. Theoretically, it suggests that the
three-strategy phase is impossible in the system.
(ii) For C+CP+DP phase:
C CP DP
C 0 0 1
2
(1− b) + 3
2
(α + β)γ
CP 0 0 1
2
(1− b) + 2βγ
DP 3
2
(b− 1)− 1
2
(α + β)γ 3
2
(b− 1)− 2βγ 0
 is the
corresponding new payoff matrix. Combing with the closure condition ρC+ρCP+
ρDP = 1 and coexisting condition PC = PCP = PDP , we obtain fractions of the
three strategies ρC = 1− 3(b−1)−2βγ(α−3β)γ , ρCP = b−1(α−3β)γ , and ρDP = 0. Theoretically,
it suggests that the three-strategy phase is impossible in the system.
Fig. 9: The frequencies of the three strategies C, D, and DP as function of α and β. The parameters
are taken as a. b = 1.6 and γ = 0.2; b. b = 1.4 and γ = 0.8. In either parameter condition, it can
be found that there exists a parameter region where the relationships 0 < ρC < 1, 0 < ρD < 1,
and 0 < ρDP < 1 are satisfied at the same time. It indicates that there are the stable coexistence
of the three strategies under the two parameter conditions.
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(iii) For C+D+DP phase:
C D DP
C 0 1
2
(1− b) 1
2
(1− b) + 3
2
(α + β)γ
D 3
2
(b− 1) 0 3
2
(α + β)γ + 1
2
(α− 3β)
DP 3
2
(b− 1)− 1
2
(α + β)γ 1
2
(β − 3α)− 1
2
(α + β)γ 0

is the corresponding new payoff matrix. Combing with the closure condition
ρC + ρD + ρDP = 1 and coexisting condition PC = PD = PDP , we plot the
profiles of ρC , ρD, and ρDP in Fig. 9 for b = 1.6, γ = 0.2 and b = 1.4 and γ = 0.8
as function of α and β. Theoretically, it suggests that the three-strategy phase
would emerge conditionally in the system.
[h]
Fig. 10: The frequencies of the three strategies CP, D, and DP as function of α and β. The
parameters are taken as a. b = 1.6 and γ = 0.2; b. b = 1.4 and γ = 0.8. It can be found that there
exists a parameter region where the relationships 0 < ρCP < 1, 0 < ρD < 1, and 0 < ρDP < 1
are satisfied at the same time. There is the stable coexistence of the three strategies for b = 1.6 and
γ = 0.2. In b., it can be observed that there are not such parameter regions where the relationships
0 < ρCP < 1, 0 < ρD < 1, and 0 < ρDP < 1 are satisfied at the same time. The stable
coexistence of the three strategies is impossible for b = 1.4 and γ = 0.8.
(iv) For CP+D+DP phase:
CP D DP
CP 0 1
2
(1− b) + 1
2
(β − 3α) 1
2
(1− b) + 2βγ
D 3
2
(b− 1) + 1
2
(α− 3β) 0 3
2
(α + β)γ + 1
2
(α− 3β)
DP 3
2
(b− 1)− 2βγ 1
2
(β − 3α)− 1
2
(α + β)γ 0

is the corresponding new payoff matrix. Combing with the closure condition
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ρCP + ρD + ρDP = 1 and co-exist condition PCP = PD = PDP , we plot the
profiles of ρCP , ρD, and ρDP in Fig. 10 for b = 1.6, γ = 0.2 and b = 1.4 and
γ = 0.8 as function of α and β. Theoretically, it suggests that the three-strategy
phase would emerge conditionally in the system for b = 1.6 and γ = 0.2.
Appendix C: The analysis of interaction webs for b = 1.4 and γ = 0.8
References
References
Adami, C., Schossau, J., Hintze, A., 2012. Evolution and stability of altruist strate-
gies in microbial games. Phys. Rev. E 85 (1), 011914.
Alexander, R. D., 1987. The Biology of Moral Systems. Transaction Books.
Antal, T., Nowak, M. A., Traulsen, A., 2009. Strategy abundance in 2× 2 games
for arbitrary mutation rates. J. Theor. Biol. 257 (2), 340–344.
Axelrod, R. M., 1984. The evolution of cooperation. Basic books, New York.
Belot, M., Bhaskar, V., Van De Ven, J., 2012. Can observers predict trustworthi-
ness? Review of Economics and Statistics 94 (1), 246–259.
Borjas, G. J., 1989. Economic theory and international migration. The Interna-
tional migration review 23 (3), 457–485.
Boyd, R., Richerson, P. J., 1992. Punishment allows the evolution of cooperation
(or anything else) in sizable groups. Ethology and Sociobiology 13 (3), 171–
195.
Brandt, H., Hauert, C., Sigmund, K., 2003. Punishment and reputation in spatial
public goods games. Proceedings of the Royal Society of London. Series B:
Biological Sciences 270 (1519), 1099–1104.
Buesser, P., Tomassini, M., Antonioni, A., 2013. Opportunistic migration in spa-
tial evolutionary games. Phys. Rev. E 88 (4), 042806.
Dercole, F., De Carli, M., Della Rossa, F., Papadopoulos, A. V., 2013. Overpun-
ishing is not necessary to fix cooperation in voluntary public goods games. J.
Theor. Biol. 326 (7), 70–81.
27
[hp]
Fig. 11: The interaction graphs for the stable existence shown in Fig 6, including the induced
predictions. The inducing rules are the same as that illustrated at the caption of Fig. 5. The
predictions just does not correspond with the real coexistence in regions B, C, E, near the junction
of the line β = 1+γ1−γα, the line β = −α+ b−13γ , and the line β = 3(b−1)4γ .
28
Dobramysl, U., Ta¨uber, U. C., 2013. Environmental versus demographic variabil-
ity in two-species predator-prey models. Phys. Rev. Lett. 110 (4), 048105.
Drinkwater, S., Levine, P., Lotti, E., Pearlman, J., Welt-Wirtschafts-Archiv, H.,
2003. The economic impact of migration: A survey. Hamburgisches Welt-
Wirtschafts-Archiv (HWWA).
Eldakar, O. T., Farrell, D. L., Wilson, D. S., 2007. Selfish punishment: altruism
can be maintained by competition among cheaters. J. Theor. Biol. 249 (2), 198–
205.
Falconer, S. B., Czarny, T. L., Brown, E. D., 2011. Antibiotics as probes of bio-
logical complexity. Nat. Chem. Biol. 7 (7), 415–423.
Fehr, E., Ga¨chter, S., 2002. Altruistic punishment in humans. Nature 415 (6868),
137–140.
Fehr, E., Rockenbach, B., 2003. Detrimental effects of sanctions on human altru-
ism. Nature 422 (6928), 137–140.
Foster, K. R., Wenseleers, T., Ratnieks, F. L., Queller, D. C., 2006. There is noth-
ing wrong with inclusive fitness. Trends. Ecol. Evol. 21 (11), 599–600.
Fowler, J. H., 2005. Altruistic punishment and the origin of cooperation. Proc.
Natl. Acad. Sci. 102 (19), 7047–7049.
Fowler, J. H., Christakis, N. A., 2010. Cooperative behavior cascades in human
social networks. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. 107 (12), 5334–5338.
Fu, F., Nowak, M. A., Hauert, C., 2010. Invasion and expansion of cooperators
in lattice populations: Prisoner’s dilemma vs. snowdrift games. J. Theor. Biol.
266 (3), 358–366.
Go´mez-Garden˜es, J., Campillo, M., Florı´a, L., Moreno, Y., 2007. Dynamical orga-
nization of cooperation in complex topologies. Phys. Rev. Lett. 98 (10), 108103.
Haley, K. J., Fessler, D. M., 2005. Nobody’s watching?: Subtle cues affect gen-
erosity in an anonymous economic game. Evol. Hum. Behav. 26 (3), 245–256.
Hamilton, W. D., 1971. Geometry for the selfish herd. J. Theor. Biol. 31 (2), 295–
311.
29
Hauert, C., Traulsen, A., Brandt, H., Nowak, M. A., Sigmund, K., 2007. Via
freedom to coercion: the emergence of costly punishment. Science 316 (5833),
1905–1907.
Helbing, D., Szolnoki, A., Perc, M., Szabo´, G., 2010a. Defector-accelerated coop-
erativeness and punishment in public goods games with mutations. Phys. Rev.
E 81 (5), 057104.
Helbing, D., Szolnoki, A., Perc, M., Szabo´, G., 2010b. Evolutionary establish-
ment of moral and double moral standards through spatial interactions. PloS
Comput. Biol. 6 (4), e1000758.
Helbing, D., Szolnoki, A., Perc, M., Szabo´, G., 2010c. Punish, but not too hard:
how costly punishment spreads in the spatial public goods game. New J. Phys.
12 (8), 083005.
Helbing, D., Yu, W., 2009. The outbreak of cooperation among success-driven
individuals under noisy conditions. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. 106 (10), 3680–3685.
Killingback, T., Bieri, J., Flatt, T., 2006. Evolution in group-structured popula-
tions can resolve the tragedy of the commons. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. 273 (1593),
1477–1481.
Knebel, J., Kru¨ger, T., Weber, M. F., Frey, E., 2013. Coexistence and survival in
conservative lotka-volterra networks. Phys. Rev. Lett. 110 (16), 168106.
Lieberman, E., Hauert, C., Nowak, M. A., 2005. Evolutionary dynamics on
graphs. Nature 433 (7023), 312–316.
Martin, P., 2012. The economic analysis of international migration and migration
policy: Toward a research agenda. Discussion Paper prepared for 22 May 2012
Migration Impacts Symposium held at COMPAS, University of Oxford.
Mathew, S., Boyd, R., 2011. Punishment sustains large-scale cooperation in
prestate warfare. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. 108 (28), 11375–11380.
Nakamaru, M., Iwasa, Y., 2006. The coevolution of altruism and punishment: role
of the selfish punisher. J. Theor. Biol. 240 (3), 475–488.
Nowak, M. A., 2006. Five rules for the evolution of cooperation. redScience
314 (5805), 1560–1563.
30
Nowak, M. A., May, R. M., 1992. Evolutionary games and spatial chaos. Nature
359 (6398), 826–829.
Nowak, M. A., Sigmund, K., 1998a. The dynamics of indirect reciprocity. J.
Theor. Biol. 194 (4), 561–574.
Nowak, M. A., Sigmund, K., 1998b. Evolution of indirect reciprocity by image
scoring. Nature 393 (6685), 573–577.
Nowak, M. A., Tarnita, C. E., Antal, T., 2010. Evolutionary dynamics in structured
populations. Philos. T. R. Soc. B. 365 (1537), 19–30.
Ohtsuki, H., Hauert, C., Lieberman, E., Nowak, M. A., 2006. A simple rule for
the evolution of cooperation on graphs and social networks. Nature 441 (7092),
502–505.
Ohtsuki, H., Nowak, M. A., 2006. The replicator equation on graphs. J. Theor.
Biol. 243 (1), 86–97.
Ohtsuki, H., Nowak, M. A., 2008. Evolutionary stability on graphs. J. Theor. Biol.
251 (4), 698–707.
Panchanathan, K., Boyd, R., 2004. Indirect reciprocity can stabilize cooperation
without the second-order free rider problem. Nature 432 (7016), 499–502.
Parkhe, A., 1993. Strategic alliance structuring: A game theoretic and transaction
cost examination of interfirm cooperation. Academy of management journal
36 (4), 794–829.
Perc, M., 2012. Sustainable institutionalized punishment requires elimination of
second-order free-riders. Sci. Rep. 2, 344.
Santos, F. C., Pacheco, J. M., 2005. Scale-free networks provide a unifying frame-
work for the emergence of cooperation. Phys. Rev. Lett. 95 (9), 098104.
Santos, F. C., Santos, M. D., Pacheco, J. M., 2008. Social diversity promotes the
emergence of cooperation in public goods games. Nature 454 (7201), 213–216.
Serra-Garcia, M., Van Damme, E., Potters, J., 2013. Lying about what you know
or about what you do? Journal of the European Economic Association 11 (5),
1204–1229.
31
Sheremeta, R. M., Shields, T. W., 2013. Do liars believe? beliefs and other-
regarding preferences in sender–receiver games. Journal of Economic Behavior
& Organization 94, 268–277.
Sigmund, K., De Silva, H., Traulsen, A., Hauert, C., 2010. Social learning pro-
motes institutions for governing the commons. Nature 466 (7308), 861–863.
Szabo´, G., To˝ke, C., 1998. Evolutionary prisoners dilemma game on a square
lattice. Phys. Rev. E 58 (1), 69.
Szabo´, G., Vukov, J., Szolnoki, A., 2005. Phase diagrams for an evolutionary pris-
oners dilemma game on two-dimensional lattices. Phys. Rev. E 72 (4), 047107.
Szolnoki, A., Szabo´, G., Perc, M., 2011. Phase diagrams for the spatial public
goods game with pool punishment. Phys. Rev. E 83 (3), 036101.
Tarnita, C. E., Antal, T., Ohtsuki, H., Nowak, M. A., 2009. Evolutionary dynamics
in set structured populations. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. 106 (21), 8601–8604.
Todeva, E., Knoke, D., 2005. Strategic alliances and models of collaboration.
Management Decision 43 (1), 123–148.
Wilson, D. S., OGorman, R., 2006. Emotions and actions associated with altruistic
helping and punishment. Evolutionary Psychology 4, 274–286.
Wolff, I., 2012. Retaliation and the role for punishment in the evolution of coop-
eration. J. Theor. Biol. 315, 128–138.
Yang, H.-X., Wu, Z.-X., Wang, B.-H., 2010. Role of aspiration-induced migration
in cooperation. Phys. Rev. E 81 (6), 065101.
32
